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Allocation of Mineral Resources in
Antarctica: Problems and
a Possible Solution
By HELENA M. TETZELI
Member of the Class of 1987
I. INTRODUCTION
Antarctica is an unspoiled and unexploited continent.' This, how-
ever, may soon change. Parties to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Treaty)2
recently discussed Antarctica's future under the terms of a proposed
agreement to determine mineral rights on the continent.'
Since 1961, exploration of Antarctica has been governed by the
Treaty.4 The Treaty successfully suspended territorial claims to the re-
gion for thirty years, declared the area a demilitarized and nuclear-free
zone, and encouraged scientific cooperation among its parties.5 The
Treaty, however, did not resolve the problems of resource development
and sovereignty over Antarctica. 6 Resource development is an issue of
growing importance due to the world's increasing demand for energy and
1. See, eg., Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: An Introductory Overview, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 277 (1983).
2. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
[hereinafter Treaty]. The original Treaty signatories and consultative parties are Australia,
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition to the original parties, Po-
land, West Germany, Brazil, and India have acceded to the Treaty and become consultative
parties. Parriott, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: Will the United States Be Left Out in the
Cold, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67, 89 n. 161 (1986). The People's Republic of China and Uruguay
also achieved consultative party status recently. See GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, THE Fu-
TURE OF THE ANTARCTIC: BACKGROUND FOR A THIRD U.N. DEBATE 1 (1985).
3. Draft Antarctic Minerals Regime [hereinafter Draft], reprinted in GREENPEACE IN-
TERNATIONAL, supra note 2, app. 9 (Nov. 25, 1985) (text of Draft not yet officially published).
4. The Treaty entered into force on June 23, 1961, after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by all twelve signatory nations. Treaty, supra note 2, at 72 n.1.
5. Under the Treaty, Antarctica was the first part of the world to be declared a demilita-
rized and nuclear-free zone. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1 (1); art. V (1). Under the Treaty, the
status of territorial claims to the region were frozen. Id. at art. IV.
6. Alexander, LegalAspects: Exploitation of Antarctic Resources, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV.
371, 381-82 (1979).
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food sources. The issue of sovereignty will become more important as
nations begin to assert their claims to the continent and its valuable natu-
ral resources. These two issues are inextricably intertwined. "The status
and weight accorded to claims of sovereignty in Antarctica is central to
the Antarctic resource problem." 7 Thus, the resolution of either problem
directly affects the other.
This Note will begin with a brief historical overview of the discov-
ery, exploration, and establishment of territorial claims to Antarctica.
The region's importance in terms of its natural resources will also be
discussed. The Note will then address the issues of sovereignty and the
future resource management of Antarctica. In particular, the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed Draft Antarctic Minerals Regime
(Draft) will be analyzed.8 Finally, a modified Draft Antarctic Minerals
Proposal will be presented as a solution to the region's mineral resources
problem.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Antarctica's discovery is important to the issue of sovereignty over
the continent. The theory of discovery and occupation has traditionally
supported claims of sovereignty under international law.9 The question
of who first discovered Antarctica, however, remains in dispute. 10 Both
the United States and the United Kingdom have made claims of discov-
ery. 1 It is possible that the first person to actually see the Antarctic
mainland was a Russian naval officer in 1821.12 In 1911, Roald Amund-
sen, a Norwegian, became the first man to reach the South Pole.13 Fur-
ther exploration was undertaken in the 1920s.14 These early expeditions
were principally motivated by the desire to explore and exploit the antici-
pated natural wealth of Antarctica. 5
Claims of sovereignty were asserted in the early twentieth century
7. Id. at 373.
8. Draft, supra note 3.
9. Pinto, The International Community and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 476-
77 (1978). European explorers of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries claimed new
lands in the names of their respective sovereigns. These states later used occupation of those
lands to buttress their claims of sovereignty. Id.




14. Oxman, The Antarctic Regime: An Introduction, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 286
(1978).
15. Expeditions were initiated by members of the fishing, whaling, and seal industries.
Parriott, supra note 2, at 72-73.
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by the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile,
and New Zealand. 6 The United States and the Soviet Union did not
assert any claims.17 Both countries, however, continue to reserve the
right to assert sovereign claims in the future,18 although neither country
recognizes the claims of other nations to Antarctica.19
The foundation for the Treaty was established during the post-
World War II years, when the United States and the Soviet Union initi-
ated the concept of internationalization of the continent.20 This concept
called for the governance of Antarctica by a group of nations.21 Formal
international cooperation resulted from the organization of the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.) in 1957. The I.G.Y. was a nongovern-
mental group research project carried out by members of the
International Council of Scientific Unions.22 More than forty research
bases were installed in Antarctica under this program with the coopera-
tion of eleven nations. The bases were located in various areas of the
continent without regard to location of claims. 23 It was understood that
"all activities.., were to be nonpolitical and could not serve as the basis
for... claims... among all I.G.Y. participants."24
In 1958, the United States invited eleven interested nations to dis-
cuss the issue of Antarctica's future.25 From these talks emerged the
current Antarctic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C. in 1959.26
16. Alexander, supra note 6, at 374-75.
17. Id. at 375.
18. Id. at 376.
19. Note, Quick, Before It Melts: Toward a Resolution of the Jurisdictional Morass In
Antarctica, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 175-76 (1976).
20. Alexander, supra note 6, at 377.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 377-78.
23. Id. at 378.
24. Id.
25. The eleven nations invited to this conference were Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom. Commentators believe that the talks were prompted by cold war considerations
because the Soviet Union had announced it intended to maintain its bases in the Australian
sector following the termination of the I.G.Y. The conference's aim was to maintain the de-
militarized status of Antarctica. Id.; United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38
DEP'T STATE BULL. 910, 911 (1958).
26. Treaty, supra note 2.
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III. ANTARCTICA'S POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A. Existence of Natural Resources
Although Antarctica is perceived as a barren, snowy wasteland, this
view is not accurate. In fact, Antarctica is thought to contain great natu-
ral wealth." Evidence indicates that Antarctica once was part of a much
larger land mass known as "Gondwanaland. ' '2s Over two million years
ago this land mass separated to form India, Africa, Antarctica, Australia,
and South America.29 Scientists infer from this evolution that ores such
as gold, platinum, cobalt, and manganese, which exist in India, Africa,
Australia, and South America, also exist in Antarctica.30 Furthermore,
there is some physical evidence corroborating this inference. Small de-
posits of these minerals, including copper and nickel, have been found in
Antarctica.3'
The discovery of hydrocarbons, such as methane and ethylene,
under Antarctica's seabed, has been of even greater interest to the oil
consuming world than minerals. In 1973, a drilling ship found hydrocar-
bons under the floor of the Ross Sea, which borders Antarctica's conti-
nental land mass.32 The United States government believes that 45
billion barrels of petroleum and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas may
lie off Antarctica's shore, beneath the bed of the Weddell Sea.33 While
the United States' estimates have not been substantiated, evidence sug-
gests that reserves exist in this area.34 Thus, few doubt the existence of
valuable minerals and other resources in Antarctica.
There are, however, three controversial questions regarding the po-
tential exploitation of Antarctica's natural resources. First, are these re-
sources commercially exploitable? Second, provided exploitation is cost
effective, can these resources be extracted in an environmentally sound
manner? Finally, if exploitation is both economically and environmen-
tally feasible, who is entitled to ownership of Antarctica and its
27. Carroll, Of Icebergs, Oilwells and Treaties: Hydrocarbon Exploitation Offshore Ant-
arctica, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1983).






33. Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691, 703
(1982).
34. Id.
35. See generally Carroll, supra note 27.
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resources? This Note focuses on the last question. A brief discussion of
the first two questions, however, is necessary in order to understand why
the issue of sovereignty over Antarctica must be resolved.
B. Feasibility of Commercial Exploitation
Opinions differ regarding the viability of commercial exploitation in
Antarctica. One commentator suggests that the local terrain and climate
are so extreme and unforgiving that only negligible profits could be real-
ized.36 Others believe that technology will eventually overcome these ob-
stacles.3 7 They are quite certain that development of the continent's
resources will occur and believe that "the question is not if Antarctic
resources will be commercially developed, but simply when."38 It is ob-
vious, however, that additional research and exploration will be required
before large-scale exploitation can occur.
C. Possible Environmental Damage Due to Commercial Exploitation
If large-scale exploitation of Antarctica does occur, the environment
could be harmed. Antarctica contains vast amounts of an important bio-
logical resource in the form of a tiny shrimp-like creature called krill.39
Krill is protein rich and could be an important food source for humans.4
In addition, large numbers of whales, seals, squid, and penguins inhabit
the region and are dependent on krill as a food source.4 1 Therefore, "the
stability of the Antarctic eco-system literally is tied to the presence of
Krill."42 A tanker accident or an oil well explosion could contaminate or
decimate the krill population.43 Thus, commercial exploitation could
detrimentally affect Antarctica's environment.
There are other practical and legal reasons why the international
community should be concerned about the environmental effects of Ant-
arctica's exploitation. Antarctica is valuable not only as a source of
36. Rich, A Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 709 (1982).
37. Carroll, supra note 27, at 207.
38. Parriott, supra note 2, at 76.
39. Joyner, supra note 33, at 701-03; Parriott, supra note 2, at 71-72.
40. Parriott, supra note 2, at 72; Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of the
Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 45, 47 n.12 (1985) (citing Sollie,
Trends and Prospects for Regimes for Living and Mineral Resources In the Antarctic, in LAW
OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISSUES 193, 200 (1979)); Joyner, supra note 33, at 703.
41. Joyner, The Southern Ocean and Marine Pollution: Problems and Prospects, 17 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165, 170 (1985); see also Scully, The Marine Living Resources of the
Southern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 341, 344-45 (1978).
42. Joyner, supra note 33, at 170.
43. Id. at 170-77.
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natural wealth, but also as a site for scientific investigation; it is the only
continent on earth left relatively untouched by humans.' In addition,
Antarctica contains over ninety percent of the world's supply of fresh
water in the form of ice,4 5 and some scientists believe the ice sheets that
cover the Antarctic landmass may affect the world's weather patterns.46
The Treaty declares as one of its objectives the "preservation and
conservation of living resources in Antarctica."'47 This language seems to
suggest that Antarctic developers must meet minimal standards of envi-
ronmental protection in order to preserve and conserve Antactica's re-
sources. Furthermore, negotiations for the Draft Antarctic Minerals
Regime resulted in the inclusion of provisions that note the "importance
of Antarctica to the world environment,, 48 and mandate that "the inter-
ests of all mankind in Antarctica... not be prejudiced."49 Because harm
to the Antarctic environment could adversely affect the ecosystem of the
entire planet, any harm to the region caused by developers would be in
violation of these provisions. A total ban on research and development,
however, is inadvisable because it would deprive nations of the potential
resources available there. Thus, a balance must be found between uncon-
trolled exploitation of Antarctica and over-protection of its resources. In
order for such a balance to exist, the issue of who is to own and control
Antarctica must be resolved.
IV. STATUS OF CLAIMS UNDER THE TREATY
To properly address the issues surrounding ownership and control
of Antarctica's mineral resources, it is necessary to discuss the present
status of sovereign claims under the Treaty. Until the tangled question
of territorial claims is resolved, a system of effective and sane manage-
ment of Antarctic resources is not possible.
The Treaty purposely did not resolve the question of sovereignty
over the region.50 According to article IV, the Treaty should not be con-
strued as a renunciation of any territorial claims, or as prejudicing the
recognition or non-recognition of any territorial claims, by any of the
parties.5" In addition, article IV specifies that "[n]o acts or activities"
44. See Joyner, supra note 1, at 277.
45. Oxman, supra note 14, at 286.
46. NOVA: Antarctica: Earth's Last Frontier (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 31, 1984)
(transcript on file at office of Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
47. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, para. 1.
48. Draft, supra note 3, preamble, cl. (g).
49. Id. art. II, cl. (g).
50. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 382; Note, supra note 19, at 184-85.
51. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 1.
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under the Treaty can support a claim.5 2 Seven of the original signatory
nations claim sovereignty over various pie shaped sectors of the conti-
nent.53 These claims are neither in accordance with nor in violation of
the Treaty. The Treaty merely froze all territorial claims to Antarctica.54
The failure of the Treaty to resolve the question of sovereignty was
deliberate and probably due to the desire of the signatory nations to
avoid any conflict between claimant states.55 There were, and still are,
overlapping claims between the United Kingdom, Chile, and Argen-
tina.56 The lack of any explicit resolution of the issue of sovereignty ena-
bled "the Contracting Parties to ratify the Antarctic Treaty and thus to
establish the Antarctic regime."57 Therefore, the Treaty's ambiguity
helped facilitate ratification, but now the territorial issue must be
addressed.58
There is a real need to define the status of claims to Antarctica.
World demand for new energy sources could eventually result in the
commencement of large-scale hydrocarbon mining activities on Antarc-
tica's continental shelf and its deep seabed.59 Several negative ramifica-
tions may result if exploitation proceeds without resolution of the
sovereign claims. The conflicting claims of the United Kingdom, Argen-
tina, and Chile may be the source of renewed dissension. Disagreements
might erupt between claimant and non-claimant states over the distribu-
tion of mineral rights." Differences concerning ownership and use of
resources may also arise between parties and non-parties to the Treaty.
A solution to the problem of territorial claims must be found which can
reconcile as many conflicting viewpoints as possible.
V. TERRITORIAL OWNERSHIP THEORIES
IN ANTARCTICA
There are two major theories of territorial ownership that have been
52. Id. art. IV, para. 2.
53. Claimant states are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Argentina,
Norway, and France. Note, Thaw in International Law: Rights in Antarctica Under the Law
of Common Spaces?, 87 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (1978). Non-claimant states are the United States,
the Soviet Union, Japan, South Africa, and Belgium. Parriott, supra note 2, at 89.
54. Note, supra note 19, at 184.
55. Id. at 185.
56. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 405. The overlapping claims resulted in a short-lived
war between the three claimants in the early 1950s. Note, supra note 19, at 184.
57. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory of
Ambiguity?," 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 201 (1985).
58. Id. at 197-98.
59. Alexander, supra note 6, at 400-02.
60. Id.
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suggested as applicable to Antarctica. At one extreme is the traditional
approach of exclusive sovereignty.61 Under this approach nations would
exercise exclusive and sole ownership rights over their respective claims
in Antarctica, with little or no interference from the international com-
munity.62 This theory is advanced by those nations that are parties to
the Treaty and that claim sovereignty to approximately 80% of Antarc-
tica.6 3 At the other extreme is the relatively new common heritage of
mankind (common heritage) doctrine. Under the common heritage ap-
proach, Antarctica would belong to all mankind.' This theory is fa-
vored by many less developed nations.65 It is necessary to analyze and
evaluate both approaches in order to properly assess the choices that ex-
ist. This Note argues, however, that for legal and practical reasons,
neither extreme is the best solution to the problems of resource manage-
ment in Antarctica. A middle ground must be found which is both eco-
nomically realistic and sensitive to the interests of all mankind.
A. Exclusive Sovereignty
1. Traditional Theory
One generally recognized basis for an exclusive sovereignty claim is
"discovery and occupation."66 This basis for sovereignty, as applied to
Antarctica, raises problems for several reasons. First, it is nearly impos-
sible to establish unequivocal title to most parts of Antarctica merely by
virtue of first discovery. Several nations claim to have discovered Ant-
arctica.67 Additionally, most early explorers who discovered a section of
the Antarctic coast laid claim to inland regions of the continent that they
had never seen, thereby adding to the confusion over who first discovered
a particular region.68 Second, discovery alone cannot confer title.69
61. See Note, supra note 53, at 806-07.
62. See W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 370 (1970).
63. Parriott, supra note 2, at 76.
64. Note, supra note 53, at 806-07.
65. The common heritage doctrine is advanced by the "group of 77," a loosely knit alli-
ance of developing countries. This group supports the establishment of a so-called New Inter-
national Economic Order, which would involve a redistribution of the world's wealth from
developed to less developed countries. Note, The Common Heritage of Mankind An Assess-
ment, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509, 516, 524 (1982).
66. Pinto, supra note 9, at 476-77.
67. Note, supra note 53, at 817-18. Nations claiming to have discovered Antarctica are
the United Kingdom, France, Norway, and the United States. See 1 G HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-65 (1940). The Soviet Union also claims to have discovered
Antarctica. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA 961 (15th ed. 1974).
68. Id.
69. W. GOULD, supra note 62, at 351.
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Some commentators argue that, under international law, discovery does
establish inchoate title which may be perfected by "effective occupation"
of the territory in question.7° This theory is flawed, however, because
international law has never adequately defined the period of time re-
quired to constitute effective occupation which is necessary to perfect
title.71 Additionally, no consistent standard exists to define the nature of
the acts necessary for a finding of "effective occupation,"72 although pos-
session and government control over the territory in question seem to be
the minimum requirements. 73 Thus, uncertainty exists regarding what
requirements are necessary to make an occupation "effective." Those
who believe that Antarctica is not subject to claims of sovereignty con-
tend that effective occupation can not occur there74 because the
Antarctic environment is inhospitable75 and, therefore, not conducive to
the degree of occupation required under this standard for valid territorial
claims.
Claimant states argue that the standard for effective occupation is
relative and dependent on several factors.76 One factor that has been
advanced concerns the physical characteristics of the area in question.77
According to such cases as Eastern Greenland7 I and Clipperton Island,79
a lesser standard for occupation might apply to sparsely populated or
70. Note, supra note 53, at 818-19.
71. Id.
72. Examples of language used to define "effective occupations" include: "possession and
continous administration," Bernhardt, Sovereignty In Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L J. 297, 324
(1975); "the intention and will to act as sovereign; and some actual continued display of such
authority," Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 3,
at 22 (Apr. 5); "sufficient governmental control to afford security to life and property," M.
LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY UNDER IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 141 (1926); "actual settlement and administration, coupled with at least
the presumption to exclude others by force if necessary," D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 409 (2d ed. 1970); "control and administration," G. SMEDAL, ACQUISITION AND SOV-
EREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 32 (1931).
73. See Note, supra note 53, at 818-19.
74. Id.
75. See Parriott, supra note 2, at 70; see also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, supra note
67, at 953 ("By far the coldest continent, Antarctica has winter temperatures that range from -
126.9 degrees farenheit... to -76 degrees farenheit.... Fierce winds characterize most coastal
regions... of ... Antarctica... and [are] responsible for... blizzards.' ... [G]usts reach]
more than 110 miles per hour.").
76. Note, supra note 53, at 821-22; see also Franklin & McClintock, The Territorial
Claims of Nations In the Antarctic: An Appraisal, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 37, 41-42 (1952).
77. Franklin and McClintock, supra note 76, at 41-42.
78. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (See A/B) No. 3.
79. Clipperton Island Arbitral Award (Fr. v. Mex.) 1931, reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L.
390 (1932).
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uninhabitable areas.8" Although commentators generally agree that the
standard for effective occupation is not certain, it is also widely agreed
that empty ritualistic acts do not suffice to establish a claim."1 The
"modified test of 'effective' occupation should not be carried to an absurd
extreme."82 Therefore, most of the activities relied upon by claimants,
such as raising flags over Antarctic territory and marking boundaries,
will fail to meet even this lesser occupation standard."3 At least one com-
mentator contends that the existence of small scientific research stations
along the Antarctic coastline will also fall short of this lesser occupation
standard due to the stations' limited investigatory purposes, dependence
on the outside world for supplies, and small, impermanent populations.8 4
Finally, even if these activities constituted "effective" occupation under
customary international law, under the Antarctic Treaty such activities
could not form the basis for territorial claims.8 5 Article IV of the Treaty
provides that "[n]o acts or activities.., shall constitute a basis for assert-
ing, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica."8 6
2. Sector Theory
The sector theory is another basis for the territorial claims of Treaty
signatories.87 This theory is a version of the principle of contiguity or
geographic proximity.88 Under modern sector theory territorial borders
in Antarctica are determined according to lines of longitude beginning at
a baseline and meeting at the South Pole. 9 This baseline may be one of
two types: either the mainland boundaries of the claimant nation or the
boundaries of lands the claimant has discovered or occupied.90 This the-
ory allows nations to make claims to vast tracts located in the interior
regions of a landmass based on either occupation of coastal areas or sov-
ereignty over land geographically proximate to the territory in ques-
tion.9" Thus, those nations closest to Antarctica, such as Chile and
80. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 47; Note, supra note 53, at 821.
81. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 46-47.
82. Id.
83. See Note, supra note 53, at 819.
84. Id. at 820-21.
85. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 1.
86. Id., para. 2.
87. Note, supra note 53, at 822-23.
88. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 47.
89. Note, supra note 53, at 822-23.
90. Id. at 823.
91. See Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 47-48.
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Argentina, have invoked the sector theory in support of their claims.92
At least one international arbitration case has rejected this ap-
proach. 93 Many scholars have also repudiated this theory,94 while others
have discounted it to "a convenient manner of delimiting claims founded
on other theories."95 As one jurist has stated, it is merely a "pretext for
attempts to preempt the sovereignty of large areas which the States con-
cerned were not yet in a position to acquire by effective occupation." 96
Furthermore, most of the international community, as well as several
Treaty signatories, have refused to recognize the application of sector
theory.9 7 Because of general nonrecognition, sector theory seems unlikely
to support a territorial claim to Antarctica.98
3. Importance of Successful Claims of Exclusive Sovereignty:
Continental Shelf Theories
If it was decided that Antarctica is subject to exclusive territorial
claims, then the claimant nations would stand to profit greatly. A find-
ing of claim legitimacy would not only allow claimant nations jurisdic-
tion and territorial rights over the continent itself, but would also give
them a plausible basis for a claim over Antarctica's continental shelf.99
Because most of Antarctica's accessible mineral wealth is believed to lie
offshore under the continental shelf or below the deep seabed,"° it is
likely that territorial claims to the shelf would be asserted.
There are three approaches available under international law to as-
sert claims to the continental shelf. The first is found in the Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf. 1 The second arises out of the North
92. See Cruz, The Antarctic System and the Utilization of Resources, 33 U. Miami L. Rev.
285, 455.
93. Island of Palmas Case (U. S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1932), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949).
94. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 47-48; Bernhardt, supra note 71, at 338
(sector theory not a legitimate principle of international law); I. BROWNUEL, Principles of Pub-
lic International Law 155 (3d ed. 1981).
95. Note, supra note 53, at 823.
96. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 48 (quoting C.H.M. Waldock).
97. The Treaty parties that do not recognize sector theory include the United States, Den-
mark, and Norway. Alexander, supra note 6, at 389-90.
98. See Parriott, supra note 2, at 88.
99. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 400.
100. See Parriott, supra note 2, at 74.
101. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2(1), 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964); see also
Alexander, supra note 6, at 400 ("These claims could be based on the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf which provided that coastal states have sovereignty over their respec-
tive continental shelves for exploration and exploitation of natural resources.").
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Sea Continental Shelf Cases.1°2 Both approaches require that before a
nation may claim sovereignty over the continental shelf, it must have
sovereignty over the land adjacent to the shelf 3 The third approach is
based on the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOS Treaty). 1"' Under the LOS
Treaty, claimant states may declare that the waters and seabed two hun-
dred miles offshore from Antarctica are an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and therefore subject to their jurisdiction.1 5 As with sovereignty
under the Geneva Convention or the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
a state that wants to establish jurisdiction over an EEZ needs a valid
claim of sovereignty over coastal land adjacent to the EEZ.10 6 Ex-
panding territorial claims to include the continental shelf under the LOS
Treaty would also give claimant states sovereign powers over the adja-
cent shelf areas for the purpose of "exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources.. . living or non-living.""1 7 Because
of the doubtful legitimacy of any territorial claims to Antarctica, it is
unlikely that sovereignty over the continental shelf will be successfully
asserted under any of these theories.
B. The Common Heritage of Mankind
The exclusive sovereignty theories advanced by claimant states have
the effect of excluding the rest of the international community from con-
trol over Antarctica. Granting specific territorial rights to certain na-
tions is directly in conflict with the emerging consensus among less
developed countries (LDCs) that certain areas of the planet, rich in natu-
ral resources, are part of mankind's common heritage.' 0 8 The common
heritage of mankind doctrine has a fairly recent origin and can be divided
into three basic tenets: 1) absence of private property rights, so that
there may be a right to use resources but not to own them; 2) interna-
tional management and control of all uses of the territory or resources in
question; and 3) sharing the wealth that results from that use. °9 Under
102. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases held that coastal states' "sovereignty over
their respective continental shelves for resource exploitation vested ipso facto upon the decla-
ration of their respective sovereignty claims." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal
Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. The Netherlands), 1969
I.C.J. 3; see Alexander, supra note 6, at 400.
103. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
104. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signing, Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N. Doc. N/Conf. 62/122 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Treaty].
105. Id. art. 55.
106. Id. arts. 55-56 (defining rights of a coastal state over an EEZ).
107. Id. art. 56, para. 1(2).
108. See Note, supra note 53, at 806-07.
109. Note, supra note 65, at 535.
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the common heritage approach, Antarctica would not be subject to
claims of exclusive sovereignty.
Historically, the common heritage doctrine can be traced to the
legal principle of mare liberum, or freedom of the seas. 110 According to
the rule of mare liberum, a state's sovereignty extends no further than
three miles offshore. The area adjacent to the coast is known as the terri-
torial sea."' The rest of the ocean constitutes the high seas and is not
subject to any state's control." 2 Due to the shared belief that no one
state or group of states should be legally able to bar others from the use
of the oceans, mare liberum developed into a rule of customary interna-
tional law."
3
Since the development of mare liberum, there has been no univer-
sally accepted embodiment of the common heritage doctrine.' '4 The
three common heritage tenets, however, have been enunciated in one
United Nations General Assembly Resolution and in two treaties."
5
The concept of a common heritage has also been a cornerstone of the
philosophy of the "group of 77."16 Nevertheless, neither the common
heritage doctrine's three basic tenets nor the general concept has been
accepted as customary international law by the international commu-
nity.' 1 7 The principle, however, has arguably acquired some force, at
least as a rallying cry for many of the LDCs.H1
The common heritage doctrine shares with the rule of mare liberum
the idea that parts of the world are not subject to sovereignty. The com-
mon heritage doctrine, however, goes further than mare liberum by im-
posing affirmative duties on states, as opposed to merely requiring states
to refrain from exercising sovereignty, as under mare liberum. Because
the common heritage doctrine is based on the belief that the world
110. See id. at 510-11.
111. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 94, at 356-57.
112. Id.
113. Id..
114. See Note, supra note 65, at 534.
115. In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled the Dec-
laration on Establishment of a New Economic Order. Its goal was to narrow the economic
gap between developed and less developed countries through international cooperation. G.A.
Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, Sixth Special Session, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/9551 (1974). The
LOS Treaty and the Moon Treaty are the two treaties enunciating common heritage principles.
LOS Treaty, supra note 104; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/
34/664 (1979).
116. See Note, supra note 65, at 516.
117. Id. at 534.
118. Id. at 518-20.
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
community is becoming increasingly interdependent, it imposes on states
a duty of responsibility towards each other to protect the environment. " 9
In addition, proponents of the common heritage doctrine believe that
equity demands a redistribution of the world's wealth. 120 Thus, the com-
mon heritage doctrine might impose an obligation on developed states to
help LDCs by redistributing money and technology. 2 '
These obligations, and their philosophical underpinnings, are evi-
dent in the three tenets of the common heritage doctrine enumerated
above. The first, the absence of property rights, refers to the idea that
some areas of the planet are not subject to exclusive sovereignty
claims.' 22 The second tenet postulates that interdependence among na-
tions requires international management and control over nonsovereign
territory and resources, and seeks to redistribute the world's wealth.'
23
The third tenet, which requires sharing of wealth obtained from the de-
velopment of resources, is related to the idea that all mankind has an
interest in the world's natural wealth.'
24
It is obvious that the common heritage principles conflict with tradi-
tional notions of exclusive sovereignty and resource allocation formu-
lated by the developed countries of the world. It is to be expected,
therefore, that most developed nations are reluctant to accept common
heritage principles which they perceive to be against their national inter-
ests. Because of this reality, it will take time before the common heritage
doctrine evolves from a "political concept"'125 into binding international
law.
C. Summary
It is doubtful that the claims of exclusive sovereignty in Antarctica
are legitimate under international law. They do not appear to satisfy the
traditional test of discovery and occupation either because the existence
of discovery is in doubt or because occupation is not effective.' 26 In addi-
tion, the sector theory has been discredited as an inappropriate basis for a
119. Id. at 509.
120. Id.
121. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, 1982: Hearings Before the House Commit-
tee On Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1982) (statement of Rep. Fields).
122. See Note, supra note 65, at 535-36.
123. Id. at 536.
124. Id. at 537; Rich, supra note 36, at 713.
125. Larschan & Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle In International
Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 306 (1983).
126. Note, supra note 53, at 817-20.
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claim of exclusive sovereignty. 127 It has not become a valid principle of
international law because it allows a nation to assert an extravagant
claim to interior lands which it has not effectively occupied, based on
either the occupation of coastal land of the subject territory or the sover-
eignty over lands close to that territory.1 28 The successful application of
the continental shelf theory is conditioned upon a nation's sovereignty
over the mainland adjacent to the claimed shelf.129 Because it is unlikely
that such a claim will be recognized in Antarctica, the continental shelf
theory will probably not be a valid basis for any claims in Antarctica.
It is also unlikely that the common heritage doctrine will be applied
to Antarctica. Although the common heritage doctrine is arguably a de-
veloping principle of international law, it is not yet binding. 3 ' In its
current form it presents an extreme and radical departure from tradi-
tional, and still dominant, notions of sovereignty. This radicalism is evi-
dent in the LOS Treaty, which embodies many of the common heritage
ideals."' Developed countries, and particularly parties to the Treaty, are
not likely to accept what they perceive as the more extreme demands of
the common heritage doctrine.1 12 Neither the non-claimant parties to
the Treaty nor the LDCs, however, are likely to accept a regime in Ant-
arctica controlled exclusively by the seven claimant states. 133 It may be
possible to propose a compromise which incorporates a modification of
the common heritage approach that is acceptable to all the parties and
thereby provides a solution to the problem of resource allocation in
Antarctica.
VI. COMPETING THEORIES OF MINERAL RESOURCE
ALLOCATION IN ANTARCTICA
A. Overview
There are four approaches to resource allocation in Antarctica.
First, the LDCs favor sharing Antarctica's resources as part of man-
kind's common heritage. 134 Second, the non-claimant signatory nations,
127. Franklin & McClintock, supra note 76, at 47-48.
128. Id.
129. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
130. Note, supra note 65, at 534; see generally Larschan & Brennan, supra note 125.
131. See infra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
132. See generally US. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121; see, e.g.,
Note, supra note 40, at 66 n. 106 (negative reactions to application of common heritage princi-
ples in Antarctica by Australia and Argentina).
133. See Pinto, supra note 9, at 480.
134. Rich, supra note 36, at 712-14; see Pinto, supra note 9, at 477; see also Note, supra
note 40, at 49-50.
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such as the United States and the Soviet Union, assert that any claims to
the region are invalid and that Antarctica should remain open to devel-
opment by any country.' 35 Third, the claimant signatory nations believe
that their claims are exclusive.I36 Fourth, environmental groups, such as
Greenpeace International, propose that a permanent moratorium on
mineral development be imposed in Antarctica.
137
The LDCs and non-claimant nations' viewpoints are similiar in that
they both favor access to Antarctica by all nations and reject any claims
to sovereignty over the area. The non-claimant and claimant countries
propose to resolve the issue of Antarctic resource allocation by relying on
the Treaty. 13  Adherents of the common heritage doctrine propose that
the LOS Treaty, or a similar document expressing common heritage
principles, should govern Antarctica. 
139
Greenpeace International (Greenpeace) advocates a permanent
moratorium on mineral resource development in Antarctica to preserve
the continent as a site for scientific investigations.1'" Greenpeace, there-
fore, opposes any agreement to govern Antarctica that allows any form
of exploration or mining. 141 Most members of the international commu-
nity agree that preservation of the environment is an important inter-
est. 142  Greenpeace's permanent moratorium, however, ignores the
reality of world needs which eventually may require development of Ant-
arctica's energy resources. 143 The environment should be protected, but
not at the cost of a permanent ban on the use of potentially valuable and
scarce resources such as those in Antarctica. The language in treaties
relevant to the issue of resource development in Antarctica emphasizes
135. See generally Note, supra note 19, at 176; Parriott, supra note 2, at 96-97.
136. See generally Joyner, supra note 33, at 720.
137. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 3.
138. Parties to the Antarctic Treaty intend to resolve the issue of resource allocation and
management through the negotiation of a new mineral resources regime. See Draft, supra note
3; see also Note, supra note 40, at 50 n.25 (consultative party response to United Nations
interest in applying common heritage doctrine in Antarctica included issuance of position pa-
per opposing "any move threatening to undermine the Antarctic Treaty"); see generally Note,
supra note 40, at 69-70.
139. See Note, supra note 40, at 49-50; Parriott, supra note 2, at 93-96; Carroll, supra note
27, at 218-26.
140. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 3.
141. Id.
142. For example, the Antarctic Treaty provides that measures are to be implemented to
insure the "preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica." Treaty, supra
note 2, art. IX. The Law of the Sea Treaty, which is representative of another segment of the
international community, declares that "states have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment." LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 192.
143. See Note, supra note 36, at 45-48.
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how to best develop Antarctica, not whether Antarctica should be devel-
oped.'" It is clear that the international community is intent on devel-
opment and will not approve or implement a total ban on development of
Antarctic resources.
B. The Law of the Sea Treaty
The LOS Treaty was drafted at the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea in 1982.1' Although the LOS Treaty does
not apply expressly to Antarctica, the proponents of the common heri-
tage doctrine probably will attempt to apply it146 because it contains
many tenets of the common heritage doctrine. 4 7 The United States, on
the other hand, probably would oppose application of the LOS Treaty to
Antarctica for two reasons. First, the United States favors the continued
administration of Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty.14 To apply the
LOS Treaty to Antarctica would conflict with United States policy on
this issue. Second, the United States perceives major flaws in the LOS
Treaty and has refused to sign it without significant alterations.149 It is
doubtful, therefore, that the United States would accept the application
of the LOS Treaty to Antarctica. United States' objections to the LOS
Treaty include: 1) mandatory technology transfers; 2) control by a
supra-national authority; 3) biased decisionmaking processes; 4) the pos-
sibility of national liberation groups receiving revenues; 5) production
limitations; 6) a review board with the power to amend the LOS Treaty
without the consent of all the parties; and 7) the LOS Treaty's disincen-
tive for financial investment. 5 ' Analysis of these objections to the LOS
144. For instance, the LOS Treaty speaks of a "legal order for the seas and oceans that will
promote.., the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources." LOS Treaty, supra note
104, preamble. The Draft proposal notes the "increasing interest in the possibility that mineral
resources may exist in Antarctica." Draft, supra note 3, preamble l(d), at IX-I.
145. If the common heritage principles applied to Antarctica, then the LOS Treaty may
also be applicable because the "Area" controlled by the LOS Treaty is defined as "the seabed
and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." LOS Treaty, supra
note 104, art. 1, para. 1(1). In this way Antarctica's continental shelf could become a part of
the Area. "By analogy, the Antarctic continent could also be considered part of the 'Area'."
It also has been suggested that, by analogy, the Southern Ocean, which surrounds Antarctica,
could also be viewed as the "high seas" under the LOS Treaty. Such a finding would subject
the Antarctic continent, the adjoining shelf, and the surrounding "high seas" to the LOS
Treaty. Parriott, supra note 2, at 96; see also Note, supra note 40, at 49-50; Carroll, supra note
27, at 219.
146. LOS Treaty, supra note 104.
147. Note, supra note 65, at 536-37.
148. Carroll, supra note 40, at 212-13.
149. See Note, supra note 38, at 69.
150. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 119, at 59-63.
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Treaty is required to determine if the LOS Treaty should serve as a
model for development of a mineral regime for Antarctica.
The LOS Treaty requires developed nations to transfer deep seabed
mining technology to LDCs."' In effect, developed nations and their
private industries would be bound by the LOS Treaty provisions to sell
their technology at a price determined by LOS Treaty authorities. The
United States opposes this provision for several reasons. First, it is con-
trary to the western legal notion that a contract is dependent on the con-
sent of the parties.1 52 Second, it would adversely affect the economic
interests of the United States and other developed countries because the
LOS Treaty defines technology very broadly. Thus, the transfer of trade
secrets or patented processes may be mandated,"5 3 which could create a
"disincentive to innovation" for technology designers and manufactur-
ers. 54 In addition, no LOS Treaty provision requires compensation to
the owner if such information escapes into the international public do-
main. 5 United States patent law also would not protect these interests
because the law has no extraterritorial application.1 56 For these reasons,
the LOS Treaty may result in harm to the economies of many developed
and underdeveloped nations. Third, and most importantly, many United
States' officials perceive this provision to be antithetical to the Western
free market system.
1 57
The LDCs counter the United States' arguments by asserting that
transfers of technology and knowledge would occur subject to a "fair and
reasonable price" requirement and only if the technology and knowledge
were unavailable on the open market.I" The LOS Treaty, however, does
not adequately define a "fair and reasonable price," and some industrial-
ists fear that such a vague standard easily could be misused by the recipi-
ents of the technology. 5 9
The United States also objects to the LOS Treaty's requirement for
control by a supra-national authority, known as the Enterprise."6 The
United States is fundamentally opposed to the creation of an organiza-
151. LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 202.
152. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 117 (statement of Carl
H. Savitt, senior vice-president, Western Geophysical Company).
153. Id. at 117-18.
154. Id. at 117.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Breaux) (forced technology transfer provisions conflict
with free market ideals).
158. See LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 144(2)(a).
159. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law oftthe Sea, supra note 121, at 117.
160, LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 170.
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tion under the LOS Treaty which would have control over the high seas
and deep seabed.161 The Enterprise would be monopolistic in that it
would regulate an inordinate amount of the world's oceans. The Enter-
prise could also engage in mining on behalf of the LDCs, thus directly
competing with the developed countries or private industry.16 2 In addi-
tion, the LOS Treaty requires that the Enterprise be funded by contribu-
tions assessed in accordance with the scale used to calculate the United
Nations budget. 63 Because the United States subsidizes a disproportion-
ate amount of the of the United Nations budget, 1" the Enterprise will be
funded, to a large degree, by a nation with whom it directly competes.
For all these reasons, the United States is opposed to the LOS Treaty's
broad grant of power to the Enterprise.
The United States also opposes the decisionmaking processes under
the LOS Treaty.165 The LOS Treaty creates three decisionmaking or-
gans. The first is the International Seabed Authority (Authority).' 6 6 All
parties to the LOS Treaty are members of the Authority. 167 The Author-
ity is a one-nation, one-vote assembly whose functions include "organiza-
tion and control of activities in the area."' 68 The LOS Treaty also
creates an organ of the Authority, known as the Assembly. 169 All mem-
bers of the Authority are also members of the Assembly.1 70 The Assem-
bly's role is to establish "general policy ... on any question within the
competence of the Authority."' 7 ' The Assembly also has the power to
elect the thirty-six members of the third organ created by the LOS
Treaty, called the Council.' 72 The Council is the "executive organ" of
the Authority and is empowered to establish "specific policies to be
pursued by the Authority." 173 Although a seat on the Council is assured
for "the largest consumer of seabed minerals," the term "largest con-
161. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 16 (statement of Rep.
Breaux).
162. LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 170.
163. Id. art. 17.
164. The United States currently contributes 25% of the United Nation's budget. T.
FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N. DREAM AND WHAT
THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT 254 (1985).
165. US. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 43-44 (statement of
Rep. Fields).
166. LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 156.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 159.
169. Id. art. 158.
170. Id. art. 159.
171. Id. art. 160.
172. Id. art. 161.
173. Id. art. 162.
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sumer" is not defined.174 Furthermore, "as consumer is commonly de-
fined, the United States is not now the largest consumer of the minerals
found on the deep seabed, and it may not be in years to come." 175 There-
fore, although the United States and other developed countries are as-
sured a seat on the Authority and the Assembly, there is no guarantee of
a seat on the Council.
176
Even with a seat on two of the decisionmaking bodies, the United
States and other developed contries may effectively have no voice. The
terms of the LOS Treaty, unlike General Assembly resolutions passed by
the United Nations, 177 will be binding on all its parties.17  Some mem-
bers of the United States government have been reluctant to enter into
treaties that contain policy making organs similar to the United Nations
General Assembly because of the perception that developed nations are
repeatedly outvoted by LDCs in such organizations. 179 Because the
membership of the LOS Treaty probably will mirror that of the United
Nations General Assembly, it is quite possible that the United States and
other developed countries would be bound by decisions outside of their
control.
The United States also opposed a provision that provided for reve-
nue sharing with national liberation groups for fear that organizations
which it opposes, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, would
receive funding. 80 Supporters of the LOS Treaty counter that the
United States could vote against such disbursements. As previously dis-
cussed, however, it is likely that the United States and other developed
countries will be outnumbered in such a vote. Hence, it is doubtful that
such donations could be prevented.
The fifth United States objection concerns production limitations on
deep seabed mining.8 Unlike the other objections, the opposition to
production ceilings is less reasonable. Mineral resources are nonrenew-
able and should be subject to some form of regulation. Prior to the
Reagan administration, the United States negotiated with the present
174. Id. art. 161.
175. US. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 170.
176. Id.
177. J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-51 (9th ed. 1984).
178. Under the customary international law principle ofpacta sunt servanda ("treaties will
be obeyed"), parties to any treaty are generally bound by its terms. Id. at 24.
179. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 5, 6.
180. Id. at 87; Article 160 of the LOS Treaty gives the Assembly the power to "consider
and approve ... equitable sharing of economic benefits derived from activities in the Area...
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing states and peoples
who have not attained full independence." LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 160 (2) (f) (i).
181. Id. at 61.
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parties to the LOS Treaty to draft an acceptable method of establishing a
fair ceiling on production.182 This method is reasonable and capable of
balancing the interests of both sides to conserve exhaustible resources. If
this method remains a part of the LOS Treaty, the concerns of the
United States would be satisfied.
Another major United States objection concerns a clause in the LOS
Treaty that allows an amendment of the Treaty after twenty years by a
three-fourths majority of the parties. 183 Some members of the United
States government believe that ratification of a treaty with this provision
would pose a constitutional problem by stripping the Senate of its power
of advice and consent for treaty ratification. 8 ' Thus, the terms of the
treaty could be changed to the nation's detriment without its consent.
This argument, however, is weakened by the fact that the United States
could withdraw from the LOS Treaty to avoid either of the above
problems.
Finally, the United States contends that the entire effect of the LOS
Treaty, particularly the technology transfer provision, discourages in-
vestment in Antarctica. 85 Developed countries and private industry still
control most of the world's technology. As is apparent by the technology
transfer provisions in the LOS Treaty, the LDCs would need this ad-
vanced technology in order also to exploit the natural resources. If those
who own the necessary technology are discouraged from using or selling
it, development will be hindered in any region to which the LOS Treaty
applies. This result would defeat a major purpose of the LOS Treaty,
which is to encourage deep seabed mining.186 In addition, the lack of
resource development in Antarctica or elsewhere would harm the entire
world community by limiting or cutting off access to valuable resources.
In summary, the United States has rejected the LOS Treaty primar-
ily because the LOS Treaty works contrary to the United States' national
interests. It is the United States' perception that the LOS Treaty "de-
mand[s] that the developed nations of the world supply the know-how
and the capital to develop deep-sea mining, but leave[s] the ownership
and control of the resources to the developing nations [LDCs]."18 7
182. During LOS Treaty negotiations in 1976, the United States agreed to a temporary
limitation, to be specified in the LOS Treaty, on the production of seabed minerals. The
amount of production allowed was to depend on the projected growth in the international
nickel market. A. Hollick, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 356 (1981).
183. LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 155.
184. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, supra note 121, at 61.
185. Id. at 118.
186. LOS Treaty, supra note 104, art. 150; see also Note, supra note 65, at 542.
187. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea Treaty, supra note 121, at 221.
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Once the LOS Treaty comes into force, non-signatory nations will
not be bound by its terms. l18 Therefore, the United States and other
nations which refuse to become parties will not legally be barred from
exploiting the deep seabed. 18 9 In terms of political and military realities,
it is unlikely that the LDCs could prevent the industrialized world from
exploiting the oceans outside the control of the LOS Treaty. Acting
against the terms of an international agreement, however, even if it is not
a party, would be against the United States' national interests. Thus,
both developed and less developed countries should strive for an agree-
ment that benefits all nations.
C. The Antarctic Treaty
The LOS Treaty does not expressly apply to Antarctica1 90 and
should not be construed to do so. Any attempt to apply the LOS Treaty
to Antarctica probably would have a detrimental effect on the interests of
the United States as well as the LDCs. The United States has the most to
offer in the way of advanced technology suitable for mining, but has re-
fused to sign the LOS Treaty. 191 If the LOS Treaty were applied to Ant-
arctica and the United States continued to refuse to sign, United States
technology would be unavailable to the LDCs. This would jeopardize
the operation of the LOS Treaty ocean mining regime 192 and reduce the
potential benefits to the LDCs. This inevitably would lead to conflict
between Treaty parties and LDCs.193 These problems can be avoided by
using the existing Antarctic Treaty to negotiate a minerals regime accept-
able to all the nations involved.
Both claimant and non-claimant consultative parties to the Treaty
favor maintaining the existing Treaty. 194 Non-claimant consultative par-
ties, however, support an agreement that would allow access to any
country capable of developing Antarctica, 195 while the claimant nations
188. Under international law, "compulsory jurisdiction depends upon the acceptance of the
actual treaty obligation which creates the jurisdiction." Id. at 38 (statement of R.V. Jennings,
former professor of law at Cambridge University, currently a judge on the International Court
of Justice).
189. Note, supra note 40, at 69.
190. The LOS Treaty does not mention Antarctica, and the legal status of the region was
not discussed during negotiations for the LOS Treaty.
191. Note, supra note 40, at 69.
192. Id. at 62.
193. See Parriott, supra note 2, at 94-96; see generally Note, supra note 38, at 63-71.
194. See Note, supra note 40, at 70-71.
195. See, e.g., Parriott, supra note 2, at 96-97 (United States' view that Antarctica is
"analogous to the 'high seas,' and therefore every state should have free access to [its]
resources.").
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favor control by present Treaty parties under the theory of exclusive sov-
ereignty.1 96 It appears that an Antarctic minerals regime under the aus-
pices of the Treaty, open to the entire international community, is the
best compromise solution.
1. Overview of Rules Governing Treaty Membership
The twelve original signatories to the Treaty were accorded the sta-
tus of consultative parties. 197 Consultative parties are the only members
of the regime with voting rights.19' Membership as a consultative party
is also available to any United Nations member state, once it accedes to
the Treaty, upon "demonstrat[ing an] interest in Antarctica by con-
ducting substantial scientific research activity there."
' 199
Other nations may accede to the Treaty and become "non-consulta-
tive parties." 2" Non-consultative parties lack voting rights but recently
have been granted "observer status" at consultative party meetings.201
The granting of observer status might have been in response to growing
international interest regarding Antarctica and its future.20 2
2. The Treaty's Success Evaluated
The Treaty is subject to modification and review in 1991.203 Ex-
tending the life of the Treaty into the next century is the optimal solution
to the Antarctic resource problem for many reasons. First, the Treaty
has been successful in its aims. Antarctica has been maintained as a nu-
clear-free, demilitarized, and open state; it has been accessible to scien-
tific investigation by any nation that desires to send expeditions.2°
Second, the Treaty's aims are not to exclude the rest of the interna-
tional community. Four new member states have joined the Treaty as
consultative parties since its inception in 1959, including several
LDCs. 20°  Many other nations have acceded to the Treaty and become
196. Id. at 98; Kansas City Star, Oct. 22, 1984, at 7A, col. 1.
197. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, para. 2; Eilers, Antarctica Adjourned? The UN. Delib-
erations On Antarctica, 19 INT'L LAWYER 1309, 1311 (1985).
198. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX (4); Eilers, supra note 197, at 1311.
199. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX(2); Parriott, supra note 2, at 89.
200. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII (1); Eilers, supra note 197, at 1311.
201. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, para. 2; GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2,
at 3, 5.
204. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 5.
205. Joining the twelve Treaty signatories as consultative parties are India, Poland, West
Germany, and Brazil. Id.
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
non-consultative parties.2"6
Third, the Treaty allows any member state of the United Nations to
accede to the Treaty as a non-consultative party and become an observer
at its consultative meetings.20 7 Although non-consultative party status
carries with it no voting rights, it does enable the party's representative
to monitor the meetings.20 8
Fourth, the Treaty has been in existence for over twenty-five
years. 20 9 There has been little or no formal protest against it, and, there-
fore, has acquired legitimacy.
21 0
Fifth, the Treaty recognizes that "it is in the interest of all mankind
that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international dis-
cord.",211 Hence, the Treaty enunciates the core idea of the common her-
itage doctrine, international interdependence and responsibility, without
its more extreme demands.
Finally, the Treaty can be altered and improved so that it responds
to the changes in world politics, energy, and environmental needs that
have occurred since its initial ratification. One need only look to the
series of conventions and recommendations negotiated within the frame-
work of the Treaty that bind the consultative parties for evidence of the
Treaty's ability to adapt.2 12 Therefore, the Treaty should be retained as
the framework within which a solution to the problems of resource own-
ership and control can be resolved.
206. Non-consultative parties include Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Peru, Finland, Ger-
man Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Denmark, Italy,
Rumania, Spain, and Sweden. Id. at 4; Parriott, supra note 2, at 89, n.161.
207. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII (1); Eilers, supra note 197, at 1311.
208. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 4.
209. The Treaty was signed in 1959 and has been in force since 1961. Treaty, supra note 2.
210. Rich, supra note 36, at 713-14.
211. Treaty, supra note 2, preamble.
212. In 1964 the Treaty parties negotiated the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Flora and Fauna. These measures provided protection for species indigenous to
Antarctica. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13,
1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S No. 6058. In 1972, the Treaty parties negotiated a Convention
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. Antarctic Treaty Signatories: Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826. Subse-
quently, a convention for the protection of marine resources was negotiated. Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, reprinted in - I.L.M. 841 (1980).
The parties have also agreed on measures dealing with oil contamination. Antarctica: Meas-
ures in Furtherance of Principles and Objectives of the Antarctic Treaty, 1979, Recommenda-
tion X-7. See also, Triggs, supra note 57, at 196.
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VI. EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPING MINERALS
REGIME: A CRITIQUE OF THE DRAFT
ANTARCTIC MINERALS REGIME AND
COMPROMISE PROPOSALS
Article IX of the Treaty provides that the consultative parties will
meet periodically in order to enact measures "in furtherance of the prin-
ciples and objectives of the Treaty." '213 This clause has enabled the par-
ties to negotiate conventions and recommendations linked to the Treaty
which are binding on its members.214 Several agreements that deal with
conservation and protection of the Antarctic environment have resulted
from such meetings.215 Article IX also has been used to initiate negotia-
tions for a minerals regime in Antarctica.21 6 Over the past few years the
consultative parties have held meetings to develop a system to regulate
mineral exploration in Antarctica.217 These negotiations have produced
an agreement known as the Draft Antarctic Minerals Regime (Draft).218
Ratification of the Draft offers the best hope for an equitable solu-
tion to the Antarctic minerals resource problem. Although the Draft
needs further amendment before it will adequately solve the resource
problem, it has some advantages which should make it acceptable to both
the LDCs and developed nations. Conceptually, the contents of the
Draft may be divided into two major components: international partici-
pation in developing the minerals regime and environmental protection
under the regime.
A. International Participation
The Draft embodies the general common heritage doctrine of inter-
national cooperation without suddenly and radically attempting to redis-
tibute the world's wealth. Common heritage principles are evident in the
fact that the regime is open to membership by additional states.21 9 In a
revision to the preamble, the Draft states that "participation in Antarctic
mineral resource activities should be open to all states.., which have an
interest in such activities and subscribe to a regime governing them.
220
Thus, party status is not limited exclusively to the original Treaty mem-
213. Treaty, supra note 2.
214. Triggs, supra note 57, at 196.
215. Id.
216. Carroll, supra note 27, at 216.
217. Id.
218. Draft, supra note 3.
219. See supra note 206.
220. Draft, supra note 3, preamble, at IX-1.
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bers. Because the Draft is being negotiated under the auspices of the
Treaty, it seems likely that a state may become a party to the Draft once
it becomes a consultative party to the Treaty,221 which will enable inter-
ested members of the international community to participate. The Draft
contains many other examples of language that that acknowledges a re-
sponsibility to the world community.222
An analysis of the Draft's decisionmaking processes further illus-
trates the Draft's objective of international cooperation. The Draft estab-
lishes a three-tiered decisionmaking system. The first tier is the
Antarctic Minerals Resources Commission (Commission) which deter-
mines whether or not to approve applications for development and explo-
ration of Antarctica.223 Membership on the Commission is composed of
consultative parties and parties that have received a permit to explore or
develop mineral resources. 224 Non-consultative parties may participate
as observers.225
Decisionmaking procedures vary among the three tiers established
by the Draft. In the Commission, decisions on "matters of substance"
are to be made by a two-thirds majority.2 26 Under a subsequent outline
that suggests amendments to the Draft (Compromise Proposals), budget-
ary decisions would be made by consensus and decisions on "matters of
substance" would require approval by a "qualified majority." '22 7 What
constitutes a "qualified majority" still must be defined by the parties.
The second tier is the Scientific, Technical, and Environmental Ad-
visory Committee (Advisory Committee) which is primarily responsible
for researching the environmental aspects of development and explora-
tion.228 The Advisory Committee is also responsible for recommending
areas to be banned totally from development.229 Advisory Committee
membership is comprised of any of the parties to the Treaty "which
221. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX(2).
222. For example, the Draft preamble states that "the effective regulation of Antarctic
mineral resource activities is in the interests of all mankind" and that "it is in the interests of
all mankind that the Antarctic ... shall continue ... to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes." Draft, supra note 3, preamble. Additionally, Article III of the Draft prohibits
activities which "disturb atmospheric, terrestial and marine environments and their dependent
and associated ecosystems beyond the area of this regime." Draft, supra note 3, art. III.
223. Id. art. XIII, para. 1.
224. Id. art. X, para. 2.
225. Id. art. X, para. 3.
226. Id. art. XV.
227. Chairman's Package Deal of Compromises [hereinafter Compromise Proposals], re-
printed in GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at IX-21.
228. Draft, supra note 3, art. XVIII, paras. 5-6.
229. Id. para. l(d).
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[have] conducted scientific research relevant to Antarctic mineral re-
source activities. ' 230 Therefore, it appears that both consultative and
non-consultative parties have voting rights on the Advisory Committee.
Decisionmaking on the Advisory Committee for "matters of sub-
stance' 231 would be by a two-thirds majority.
Finally, the Draft proposes a Regulatory Committee232 which would
monitor any development, and explore, review, and revise such develop-
ment so that it remains consistent with the regime's policies.233 The
standards that must be met in order to "remain consistent with the re-
gime" include principles enunciated in article III of the Draft.234 Under
the most recent Draft, the Regulatory Committee would consist of no
more than eight parties.235 Of these eight, no more than four may be
claimant states.2 36 A Compromise Proposal, submitted by the chairman
of the meeting, proposes a more complex formula for Regulatory Com-
mittee membership.237 Under this plan, ten parties would participate in
the Regulatory Committee's functions.238 These participants would in-
clude: 1) the United States and the Soviet Union; 2) "four interested non-
claimant states including at least one interested developing country"; and
3) "four [interested] claimant states including the relevant claimant state
or states. '2 39 This latter method seems to be more responsive to the de-
mands of the LDCs because of its mandatory inclusion of at least one
underdeveloped nation in the decisionmaking process.
Under the Draft, decisionmaking in the Regulatory Committee
would be by a simple majority.24 The Compromise Proposals, however,
suggest a system whereby decisions would be made by a "qualified major-
ity." This majority would have to include a simple majority of both
claimant and non-claimant states.241 Therefore, although either claim-
ants or non-claimants could have veto power, no one state acting alone
would. This system would tip the scales against the claimants, which
230. Parties that have not conducted scientific research in the area have been granted ob-
server status on the Advisory Committee. Id. art. XVI.
231. Id. art. XIX.
232. Id. art. XX.
233. Id.
234. These principles concern the mechanisms for environmental protection provided by
the Draft. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
235. Id. art. XI, para. 2.
236. Id. para. 3(d).
237. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227.
238. Id. at IX-21.
239. Id.
240. Draft, supra note 3, art. XX.
241. See Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, at IX-21.
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otherwise would be able to guard their interests through the use of their
individual vetos. Nevertheless, this proposal is equitable because the
claimants could exercise a veto by voting collectively.
The Compromise Proposals also suggest the addition of a new tier to
the decisionmaking process. This tier would be known as the "Special
Meeting of States Parties" and would, like the Advisory Committee, be
composed of all parties to the regime.242 Its purpose would be to deter-
mine, after initial consideration by the Advisory Committee and the
Commission, if any area should be open to either exploration, develop-
ment, or both.243 Decisions would be made by a simple majority, but the
consensus of the consultative parties would be required.2 "
When viewed in conjunction with the Compromise Proposals, the
Draft appears to express the varying interests of all members of the inter-
national community. It does have some problems, however, that should
be remedied. First, its terms should be defined more adequately. Lan-
guage such as "qualified majority" and "matters of substance" must be
clarified. Second, all decisionmaking processes under the Draft should
be by a simple majority or by the method described under the Compro-
mise Proposals for voting in the Regulatory Committee.245 This recom-
mendation is aimed especially at the requirement of consultative party
consensus for decisions by the Special Meeting of States Parties.246 This
requirement seems to be both inequitable and unnecessary. It is inequita-
ble because it unduly limits the influence of the non-consultative parties
by giving the consultative parties individual veto power. It is unneces-
sary because it gives this power to the consultative parties when a major-
ity of non-consultative parties probably would vote to develop
Antarctica. The non-consultative parties are predominantly LDCs, and
LDCs are not opposed to the development of Antarctica. Rather, they
wish to take part in and benefit from any development that does occur.247
Because requiring a consensus by the consultative parties appears to be
unfair as well as superfluous, voting in the Special Meeting of States Par-
ties should be by a simple majority.
In addition, membership on the Regulatory Committee should be
extended to two or three LDCs instead of the token single seat alloted by
242. Id. para. 1(A).
243. Id. para. I(B).
244. Id. para. 1(C).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 240-44.
246. See supra note 244.
247. See generally Eilers, supra note 197.
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the Compromise Proposals. 4 ' Finally, participation in the decisionmak-
ing process should be more easily facilitated. Approval of an applicant's
request for consultative party status should be by a simple majority and
not by consensus. Again, the consensus vote allows an individual state to
exclude another against the wishes of a majority and is, therefore,
inequitable.
B. Environmental Protection
The Draft offers a system with advantages as well as disadvantages
for the environmental protection of Antarctica. Article III of the Draft
correctly prohibits any mineral activity until an impact assessment has
been made. Then, development will be allowed only if a "reasonable
judgment" has been made that exploitation will not "have any but mini-
mal local effects" and will not "affect global or regional climate or
weather patterns." 24 9 The Draft also forbids any mineral activity outside
the regime established by the Draft or the Treaty, which requires parties
to adhere to the Draft's standards.25 Furthermore, the Draft mandates
observance of the rules established by the Treaty or by a convention
linked to the Treaty.25 The Special Meeting of States Parties suggested
by the Compromise Proposals, if incorporated into the Draft, may pro-
vide another layer of environmental protection by requiring further in-
vestigation into the feasibility of a prospective development plan.252
Neither the Draft nor the Compromise Proposals, however, provide
a policing body to enforce their environmental protections. Although
the Advisory and Regulatory Committees and the Special Meeting of
States Parties serve necessary roles, none of them have the power to pe-
nalize states or private companies which violate either the Draft or the
Treaty standards. This is a major flaw in the regime that must be ad-
dressed if its aim of environmental protection is to be fulfilled. The most
effective solution would be the creation of an organ, composed of a mem-
ber from each of the regime's parties, with the power to penalize viola-
tors. Penalties could be established on the basis of a graduated system
determined by the gravity of the offense. For instance, a minimal viola-
tion could result in public censure or a fine assessed against the violator.
A major offense could result in temporary or permanent denial of devel-
opment privileges. In order to prevent a nation from protecting one of its
248. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, at IX-21, para. 3(A)-(b).
249. Draft, supra note 3, art. III, para. (A)(iv).
250. Id. art. III.
251. Id. art. VIII.
252. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, at IX-21.
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own industries, such a decision should be made by a two-thirds majority,
and not by unanimous vote.
C. Additional Recommendations
The current consultative parties should open subsequent Draft nego-
tiation meetings to the world press. This would further the cause of in-
ternational cooperation and give the process enhanced legitimacy. For
similar reasons, the consultative parties should be more willing to share
information with the non-consultative parties. There have been com-
plaints by non-consultative parties that they have not received important
documentary information that relates to the negotiations for a new min-
erals regime.2 53 Equal access to information by consultative and non-
consultative parties should lead to better relations between the two
groups as well as increased legitimacy of any Antarctic minerals regime
which ultimately results from the negotiations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Antarctic Treaty and its conventions have been successful in
achieving their objectives, and, thus, the world community should con-
tinue to utilize them. The continued success of these agreements, how-
ever, may require periodic improvement and alteration to adapt to new
world conditions. The minerals regime that is evolving under the aus-
pices of the Treaty seems to offer an acceptable framework, although not
a perfect finished product, for a system of mineral resource allocation
and management in Antarctica. It offers LDCs a voice in control and
development of the region. At the same time, developed nations, capable
of exploring and developing Antarctica, retain some necessary degree of
control and financial incentive. The Draft's major flaws are its lack of a
policing organ to protect the environment and certain terms which are
ambiguous. These problems, however, can be remedied. Changes such
as those suggested in this Note should be considered by the Treaty par-
ties to help clarify the Draft and make it an enforceable document for the
benefit of the international community.
IX. ADDENDUM
In April of 1986, the Treaty parties met in Hobart, Australia for
another round of negotiations concerning the development of mineral
253. GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 2, at 4.
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resources in Antarctica.2 5 4 While an in depth discussion of the Draft
Antarctic Minerals Regime (Draft II) which resulted from these talks is
beyond the scope of this Note, a few of the changes and additions to the
Draft and the Compromise Proposals will be highlighted.
A. International Participation
According to Christopher Beeby, the Chairman of the Hobart nego-
tiations, the parties reached a consensus that "prior adherence to the
Antarctic Treaty will be required of any State wishing to become party to
the minerals regime." '255 Because states may accede to the Treaty,256 this
requirement should not result in arbitrary exclusion of any states inter-
ested in joining the minerals regime.
One potentially important modification made by Draft II concerns
membership on the Regulatory Committee. The Compromise Proposals
required that "at least one interested developing country" be included in
the membership of the Regulatory Committee.257 Article XXIX of Draft
II instead requires that the Chairman of the Commission "shall ensure in
the membership of the Regulatory Committee equitable and adequate
representation of developing countries."25 This language is vague in
comparison to the Compromise Proposal's clear LDC requirement.259
Because the language in article XXIX mandates LDC representation,
however, this new provision may leave little discretionary power in the
hands of the Commission Chairman to exclude developing countries. In
addition, the language of article XXIX may require that more than one
member of the Regulatory Committee be an LDC, in order to satisfy the
"equitable and adequate representation" standard.
In conclusion, while under the Compromise Proposals the LDC's
were assured of at least one position on the Regulatory Committee, no
standard of equitable representation was imposed which could require
that more than one LDC be offered membership. 26 ° Draft II's require-
ment of "equitable and adequate representation ' 261 may mandate more
LDC representation. To eliminate any possible exclusions of LDC's
254. Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention: Chairman's Informal Personal Report:
MR/17 Rev. II (Sept. 19, 1986) (available through Greenpeace International).
255. Id. at 9.
256. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII (1).
257. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, at IX-21.
258. Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention: Draft Articles, art. XXIX(3) (b) (Sept.
1986) (available through Greenpeace International) [hereinafter Draft II].
259. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, at IX-21.
260. Id
261. Draft II, supra note 258, art. XXIX(3)(b).
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from the Regulatory Committee, however, article XXIX should be
amended to require at least one LDC be a member at all times.
B. Environmental Protection
Draft II makes a major addition to the environmental protections
provided for in the Draft. Article XIV establishes environmental "buffer
zones" where mineral development activities would be restricted or pro-
hibited.z6u Article XIV requires the Commission to consider whether it
would be "prudent" to prohibit or restict development in buffer zones
adjacent to areas already designated as protected and off-limits to
development.2 63
Draft II also adopts the Compromise Proposal's suggestion of a Spe-
cial Meeting of States Parties. 264 As discussed above, this organ will be
part of the decisionmaking process in planning the exploitation of Ant-
arctica's resources.z65 The adoption of the Special Meeting of States Par-
ties by Draft II indicates that the final version of the Draft Antarctic
Minerals Regime will provide for the establishment of this decisionmak-
ing body.
C. Conclusion
The addition to Draft II of buffer zones and its adoption of the Spe-
cial Meeting of States Parties illustrates the committment the Treaty par-
ties have to protecting the environment. Draft II, however, fails to
remedy the problems of enforcement and use of vague terms. These re-
main serious flaws in the minerals regime and should be addressed.
262. Id. art. XXVIII.
263. Id.
264. Id. art. XXVIII.
265. Compromise Proposals, supra note 227, IX-21.
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